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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-
3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The appellant believes there is only one issue presented to the Court on appeal. 
That issue is whether or not the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman had been perfected as 
against the Appellee. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented is a question of law. The Court is not obligated to give 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, but reviews them for correctness. In the 
matter of the adoption of W. Baby Boy. 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCE, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS 
ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
The applicable constitutional provision is the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution which provides in part: "No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or propeity, without due process of 
law.5 
Utah Constitution Ait. I, Section 7: "No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-30-4.2(2)(e); 78-30-4.14(2); 78-30-4.15; 78-30-7, all 
of which sections are attached to the Appendix herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter was based upon the Appellee's attempt to set aside the adoption of 
Sidney Laken Fluhman by the child's maternal grandmother, Paige Parsons. The matter 
was tried on April 27, 1999, by the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, Judge Second District 
Court, Davis County, State of Utah. An adoption proceeding had occurred, which was 
filed on January 12, 1998, in Second District Court in Case No. 982700016, when the 
minor child, Sidney, was over the age of six months old, Sidney having been bom on 
March 26, 1997. The trial court had determined that the Appellee, Timothy J. Sanchez, 
was entitled to notice, and thus the adoption as related to him was not perfected, and that 
the placement of the child, if it had ever occurred, occurred sometime on or 
approximately January 12, 1998, when the action was filed in the Second District Court. 
The effect of the court's mling was to allow the Appellee to thereafter file any additional 
pleadings that he wished to in order to seek paternity and visitation, or for the Appellants 
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to take further action on the adoption after complying with the notice requirement, as 
each party so chose. 
(NOTE TO THE COURT: The Appellee has subsequently filed a petition for 
paternity in Case No. 994700813, which is in the Second District Court, Davis County, 
State of Utah. The Appellee has subsequently been granted visitation rights to Sidney 
Laken Fluhman, and he has been declared as the natural father of said child in that case. 
A petition to terminate parental rights, was made by the Appellant, Paige Parsons, in the 
Second Judicial Juvenile Court, in Case No. 980110, has been dismissed by the Juvenile 
Court.) 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Paige Parsons, an appellant, is the mother of Laura Fluhman, also an appellant, 
and the maternal grandmother of Sidney Laken Fluhman. Laura Fluhman has always 
resided with Parsons, and continues to do so. (Tr. p. 82, lines 1-10) 
The appellants have always at all time relevant herein resided in Davis County. 
During 1996, Appellee, Timothy Sanchez ("Sanchez") and appellant, Laura 
Fluhman ("Fluhman") entered into a relationship. During the course of this relationship, 
Fluhman conceived a child. 
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On March 26, 1997 a child, Sidney Laken Fluhman ("Sidney"), was born at 
University Hospital. It is uncontested that Sanchez is the natural father of Sidney. (Tr. p. 
82, lines 16-20) 
However, Sanchez's name was not listed on the birth certificate as the father of Sidney. 
The birth certificate lists the father as "unknown" which is an untrue statement. (Tr. P. 
97, lines 8-13) 
In September, 1996, prior to Sidney's birth, Sanchez opened a savings account at 
America First Credit Union in the name of Laura Fluhman and regularly deposited money 
each week into this account, which money was withdrawn by Laura Fluhman for her use 
during her pregnancy. (Tr. p. 13, lines 23-25; p. 14, lines 1-25; p. 83, lines 12-16; p. 
106, lines 5-10; p 83, lines 12-18.) 
There were numerous occasions, prior to the birth, that Sanchez and Fluhman 
discussed raising Sidney together as parents, even though they knew that they would not 
be together as a couple. (Tr. p. 15, lines 6-23, p. 16, lines 11-15) 
Fluhman and Sanchez discussed insurance needs prior to the birth of the child. 
Sanchez offered to add Sidney to his insurance policy that he earned through his 
employment. Fluhman declined to accept the coverage for Sidney, claiming that Sidney's 
was covered through Parsons' insurance, and that Fluhman wanted Sidney to be covered 
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under Parsons' insurance. Fluhman repeatedly told Sanchez that she did not want 
Sanchez to provide insurance and would not allow Sidney to have his surname, since she 
wanted Sidney to be covered under Parson's insurance. (Tr. p. 12, lines 10-25, p. 13, 
lines 1-2) 
Sanchez also provided a changing table, baby clothes, diapers, and assorted other 
baby items, which were turned over to Fluhman for the care and use of Sidney. (Tr. p. 20, 
lines 16-25., p. 21, lines 1-25, p. 22, lines 1-25, p. 23, lines 1-13.) 
Approximately three months prior to Sidney's birth, Fluhman informed Sanchez 
that his name would not be placed on the birth certificate and his child would be given 
the name of Fluhman, rather than Sanchez. (Tr. p. 11, lines 24-25; p. 12, lines 1-9.) 
Fluhman assured him that this was only for insurance puiposes. (Tr. p. 97, lines 2-6.) 
Sanchez asked to be present for Sidney's birth and asked Fluhman to call him 
when she was going to the hospital. It was his belief that she was going to do so. (Tr. p. 
13, lines 10-22.) 
Fluhman did not keep her word that she would call him when she went to the 
hospital. Sanchez was informed of the birth by someone else. Sidney was bom on 
March 26, 1997, three weeks premature. As a consequence of her premature birth, 
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Sidney remained in the hospital after Fluhman was released. Fluliman did not contact 
Sanchez until five days following the birth of Sidney. (Tr. p. 86, lines 1-22.). 
After being informed of the birth by a third-party, Sanchez went to the hospital to 
visit his child. He approached a group of nurses in the neonatal unit and asked to see his 
baby. They asked for the name of the child. When he responded that her name was 
Sidney "Fluhman", the nurses conferred with each other out of earshot of Sanchez and 
then informed him that there was no child by that name there. While still at the hospital, 
Sanchez contacted Fluhman and asked her what was going on. She responded by 
becoming upset that he was at the hospital and told him that he could not see the baby by 
himself. He was not allowed to see Sidney on this visit to the hospital. (Tr. 17, lines 21-
25; p. 18, lines 1-24.) 
No documents were given to Sanchez by the hospital staff. He was not shown a 
birth certificate or informed about filing any document of paternity. (Tr. 19, lines 2-17 .) 
Sanchez called Fluhman again and made a date with her to go to the hospital to see 
Sidney. Fluhman subsequently met him at the hospital on April 9, 1997, and went with 
him to see Sidney. Sanchez found out later than Sidney was, in fact, at the hospital, but 
was there under an assumed name of "Hyde". (Tr. p. 84) Again, no birth certificate 
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was shown to Sanchez, nor was he informed about paternity documents. (Tr. p. 24, lines 
5-16.) 
When Sidney left the hospital, she and Fluhman resided at the home of Fluhman's 
mother, Paige Parsons ("Parsons"). Because of a remodeling of Parsons' home to make 
room for Fluhman and Sidney together, for the first few months of Sidney's life, Sidney 
slept in Parson's room in a small playpen. After the remodeling, Sidney was moved to 
Fluhman's room, where she continues to sleep at night. (Tr. p. 88, lines 9-24.) 
At this time, Sanchez was divorced from his wife and was paying child support for 
his two children from his marriage. 
After the birth of Sidney, each month Sanchez gave Fluhman a check for the 
support of Sidney, just as he gave his ex-wife money for the support of their two children. 
His payments to Fluhman began in April, 1997. He determined the amount of this 
payment for the support of Sidney by looking at a child support worksheet for the 
payment of support of his two children from his marriage where he found the amount for 
three children, and paid one third of that amount to Fluhman each month. (Tr. p. 25, 
lines 19-25; p. 26, lines 1-25, p.27, lines 1-11.) 
Sanchez again expressed his desire to parent Sidney and to have "all the rights that 
the law says that a father deserves." (Tr. p. 15, lines 17-20). Fluhman repeatedly assured 
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Sanchez that he was welcome to visit Sidney whenever Fluhman and Parsons were at 
home and it was convenient to do so. Sanchez began to visit Sidney approximately twice 
a month, usually on weekends when he had visitation with his other children. He often 
brought his two girls along to visit with Sidney and began to ask when he would be able 
to take the baby from Parsons home and visit with her and his other children as a family 
unit. Fluhman and Parsons told him that Sidney was too young to leave their home with 
him, but assured him that a time would come when he would be able to take Sidney for 
visits. Fluhman and Parsons set dates when Sidney would be old enough to go with 
Sanchez, but when those dates came, Fluhman and Parsons would continue the time to 
sometime in the future. (Tr. p. 31, lines 14-25; p. 32, lines 1-25; p. 33, lines 1-23. 
Sanchez continued to give Fluhman checks for the support of Sidney, and Fluhman 
continued to accept these checks. She and Sanchez continued to discuss the parenting of 
Sidney and Fluhman assured him that she would always make Sidney available to him 
and would welcome his participating in the parenting of Sidney. Sanchez continued to 
look forward to the time when he would be able to visit with Sidney and his other 
children at a place of his choosing. 
On September 26, 1997, Fluhman brought Sidney to the home of a friend of 
Sanchez where Sanchez was residing and visited with him there. (Tr. p. 34, lines 15-23.) 
-8-
Sanchez continued to visit with Sidney at least twice monthly, often bringing his 
other two children along with him so that he could bond with Sidney and the three 
children could be a family unit. He continued to plan for the time when he could 
participate with Sidney as she grew, and Fluhman continued to assure him that she would 
never keep Sidney from him. 
In December 1997 Sanchez received a raise in salary and immediately increased 
his child support for Sidney from $165 to $175 monthly. Fluhman continued to accept 
the checks given to her by Sanchez. (Tr. p. 46, line25; p. 47, lines 1-19.) 
On December 23, 1997, Fluhman, Parsons, and two of Fluhman's sister brought 
Sidney to the home where Sanchez was living. There, along with Fluhman's family and 
friends they participated in a Christmas party for Sidney. They ate dinner together and 
watched Sidney open the Christmas gifts provided for Sidney by Sanchez. (Tr. p. 36, 
lines 16-22.) 
Sanchez continued to visit Sidney at the home of Fluhman and Parsons through the 
rest of 1997 and January of 1998. Sanchez was making plans with Fluhman to take 
Sidney to his home for his birthday. Fluhman told him that "it might be a possibility. 
We'll see what happens when it comes around." (Tr. p. 40, lines 2-7) 
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On February 14, 1998, Fluhman called Sanchez and told him that Parsons had 
adopted Sidney. At this time, Fluhman told Sanchez that she did not intend to keep 
Sidney away from him. Fluhman also assured Sanchez at this same time that the 
adoption was only for medical insurance purposes. Fluhman also told Sanchez that they 
wouldn't take his money anymore, because Parsons had adopted Sidney. When Sanchez 
stated that he would send the money to Parsons, Parsons told him that they would just 
send the money back. (Tr. p. 40, lines 7-25; p. 41, lines 1-25; p. 48, lines 1-6.) 
On March 29, 1998, Sanchez hosted a birthday party for Sidney at the home of his 
friend, where Sanchez was residing. His family and friends attended this party, with 
some of Fluhman's family. Sidney was brought to the home of Sanchez by Fluhman and 
Parsons. (Tr. p. 48, lines 11-25; p. 49, lines 1-7.) 
Sanchez continued to visit Sidney at least two times a month at the home of 
Fluhman and Parsons during the months of April, May and June of 1998. (Tr. p.49, lines 
8-24.) 
On July 8, 1998 while Sanchez was again visiting Sidney at the home of Fluhman 
and Parsons, Fluhman told Sanchez that it would be "best that I went on my own way and 
she went her way." She them told Sanchez that she was not going to allow him to see 
Sidney anymore. (Tr. p. 50, lines 1-4.) However, later during this same visit, she told 
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Sanchez that she would call him in a few weeks and he could bring his other children to 
visit with Sidney. However, she did not make that call. 
After this date, Sanchez was not allowed visitation with his child, Sidney. 
In September, 1998, Sanchez caused a complaint to be filed against Parsons and 
Fluhman in the Second District Court, Davis County. The complaint alleged four causes 
of action. The first cause of action alleged that Sidney was a minor and as such a 
Guardian Ad Litem should be appointed to protect Sidney's best interests. 
Sanchez's second cause of action alleged that Parsons adoption of Sidney was 
fraudulent, demanded that the adoption be set aside, that Sanchez be deemed Sidney's 
natural father, that he be given parental rights, and that Sidney be given his surname. 
Sanchez's third cause of action alleged that Parson's adoption of Sidney was 
fraudulent, and should be set aside. 
Sanchez's fourth cause of action alleged inducement, i.e. that Laura made 
fraudulent statements to Sanchez upon which he relied. The fourth cause of action 
demanded general, special, punitive, and exemplary damages against Fluhman and 
Parsons in an amount not less than $500,000. 
A bench trial was held on Sanchez's Complaint on April 27, 2000 in the Utah 
Second District Court, Davis County, Judge Thomas L. Kay presiding. Fluhman and 
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Parsons were present and represented by counsel, Keith Eddington. Sanchez was present 
and represented by Randy S. Ludlow. 
On April 27, 1999, the trial court found that Sidney was placed for adoption after 
she was at least six months old. Sanchez was not notified of the adoption, and therefore 
his parental rights were violated by Fluhman and Parsons. The Court found that 
placement of Sidney occurred after the petition of Fluhman and Parsons was filed in 
Second District Court, Davis County on approximately January 12, 1998. The Court 
found and awarded judgment to Sanchez on the basis that Parsons' adoption of Sidney 
was not perfected as to Sanchez, as no notice of the adoption was given to Sanchez. 
On July 14, 1999, during a hearing on Defendant's Objections to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court ruled Ihat the applicable statute was U.C.A. § 78-
30-4.14 (2)(a) or 2(b), and that section (4) was not applicable. The court ruled that 
"placement presumes notice and living with respondent was ambiguous as to notice." 
(July 14, 2000 hearing, p. 9, lines 24-25.) The court went on to say regarding Sanchez's 
relationship with Sidney, that". . . regarding his relationship with the child, a measure of 
responsibility, visited at least monthly, that under those circumstances under U.C.A. § 78-
30-4.14 his consent was necessary to the adoption and that he should have been given 
notice to the matter." (July 24, 1000 hearing p. 10, lines 2-7.) 
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Since the birth of Sidney, Fluhman has always been the child's caretaker. (Tr. p. 
93). Fluhman gets Sidney up in the mornings, feeds the child, plays with the child, reads 
to the child, bathes the child and acts as the child's mother while Parsons leaves and goes 
to work between 6:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m., returning to the home between 6:00 p.m. and 
7:00 p.m. and sometimes as late as 10:00 p.m. (Tr. p. 89, 90, 92, and 93). Parsons is 
gone twelve to thirteen hours per day (Tr. p. 91). It is clear that Fluhman is the parent 
and not Parsons. Fluhman claimed that the purpose of the adoption was because of her 
health problems (she has diabetes) and insurance. (Tr. p. 94). Fluhman doesn't work 
(Tr. p. 87). She spends her days with Sidney. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellee, Timothy J. Sanchez, was entitled to notice before the Appellants 
proceeded with the adoption proceedings. Because no notice had been given to him, the 
adoption as it relates to his rights had not been determined, and the adoption had not been 
perfected. Appellee thereafter had the right to file appropriate proceedings to establish 
his paternity to the child or the Appellants to proceed with their adoption. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED 
THAT SIDNEY LAKEN FLUHMAN'S ADOPTION AS IT RELATES 
TO THE APPELLEE HAD NOT BEEN PERFECTED, WHICH 
SET ASIDE THE ADOPTION IN REGARDS TO THE RIGHTS 
OF THE APPELLEE 
The Appellee did not give his consent to the adoption and he was not personally 
served with notice of the adoption proceeding as required by Utah law. The consent of 
an unmarried biological father is required before an adoption can proceed provided the 
father meets certain criteria listed in Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.14. The 
requirements vary depending on the age of the child at the time the child is "placed with 
adoptive parents". U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(a)&(b) (1953, as amended). 
In cases where the child is over six months old before being placed with adoptive 
parents the consent of an unmarried biological father is required if the father: 
[has] developed a substantial relationship with the child, taken some 
measure of responsibility for the child and the child's future, and 
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 
financial support of the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in 
accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented from doing so by 
the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. U.C.A. 
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). 
In addition to the above requirements, an unmamed biological father must also do one of 
the following: 
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(A) visitf] the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to 
do so, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized 
agency having lawful custody of the child; or 
(B) [have] regular communication with the child or with the person or 
agency having the care of custody of the child, and when not prevented 
from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of 
the child. Id. 
If the father of such a child meets these requirements, then Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-30-4.13 mandates that before the child can be adopted, the father must consent and 
receive personal service of the adoption proceeding. U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4.13(2)(a) & 78-
30-4.13(11) (1953 as amended.) 
The trial court looked to determine when the child had been "placed" for adoption. 
In reviewing this, the court looked at two factors. The first of these was the statute as set 
forth at U.C.A. § 70-30-7(1) which provides that "the adoption procedure commences by 
filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the district where the person 
adopting resides, or with the juvenile court . . ." Section (2) provides "a petition for 
adoption shall be filed within thirty days of the date the adoptee is placed in the home of 
the Appellee for purposes of adoption . . . ." (Emphasis added) The requirements in 
U.C.A. § 78-30-7(1) are jurisdictional. Appellants claim that this is a venue issue which 
is contrary to the statute. The trial court had determined that because the child and 
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Parsons lived in Davis County, jurisdiction occurred where the petition for adoption was 
filed in that county. 
The court thereafter looked at the facts in this case to determine whether a 
placement had ever occurred, as it would be typically defined by the term. The 
grandmother and child both resided in Davis County, and thus no "placement for 
adoption" had occurred until the proceedings commenced in Davis County on 
approximately January 12, 1998. (See Conclusions No. 2 and 4). In reviewing the facts, 
it was apparent that the child had never been "placed for adoption" because the child still 
continues to be raised and taken care of by the child's natural mother, who has never, in 
fact, relinquished control or care of the child. (Findings 24 and Conclusion No. 6). 
Based upon these factors, the trial court had thereafter determined that the child was at 
least six months old when it was placed for adoption that thereby not requiring the 
Appellee to meet the more stiingent requirements of U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). Even if 
it was determined that Sidney was "placed" for adoption in the home of Paige Parsons, 
that placement could only have occurred sometime approximately January 12, 1998, 
when the Second District Court acquired jurisdiction of the action. The 30 day rule, 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-30-7(2) would still have placed the age of the child at least six 
months or greater at the time of the "placement." Because the natural mother has not 
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relinquished physical custody of the child, Sidney has and was never actually "placed" 
with adoptive parents, because Fluhman has never stopped acting as her mother. 
In a very similar case, the Utah Court of Appeals confronted ambiguity created by 
similar language of an older version of Utah's adoption act. In re K.B.E. and TM. E., 
740 P.2d 292 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion, did not 
think that the unmarried father was statutorily required to register an acknowledgment of 
paternity because, like Fluhman, the mother never actually surrendered her parental rights 
or released physical custody or control of her child. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). In 
situations where the mother does not relinquish physical custody or control of her child, 
the state's declared strong interests diminish greatly in importance. 
For example, if a mother does not cease to act as the child's parent, the state no 
longer needs to "promptly determine those persons who will assume the parental role." 
Id. If the mother continues to provide the child with physical care, the state need not 
assure "immediate and continued physical care." Id. Also, if a mother remains with her 
child, the state no longer has a strong interest in "facilitating uninterrupted bonding of a 
child to its parents." Id. 
Like the mother in K.B.E., Fluhman has not relinquished physical custody or 
control over her child. Because Fluhman has continued to live with Sidney and has 
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continued to provide primary care, "speedy termination of the natural father's interests is 
not necessary" in this case. Since the state has no interest in terminating Appellee's 
parental rights, it cannot justify requiring him to timely file a formal acknowledgment of 
paternity, especially where the Appellee has already established a substantial relationship 
with Sidney. 
Based on the statute and the facts, the trial court had determined that the child's 
placement, if it occurred at all, only occurred when the child was at least six (6) months 
old with that time being approximately January 12, 1998 (Conclusion #6). The trial 
court, in determining when the child was "placed" for adoption, having occurred after the 
child was six months old, thereafter turned its attention and focus on whether or not the 
Appellee had complied with U.C.A. § 70-30-4.14(2)(a)(i), (A) or (B) to determine 
whether or not notice would have been required as to him, or his consent given, so that 
the adoption would be perfected, which would thereafter have terminated his rights to the 
child. The testimony as provided at trial established, prior to the child's birth, that 
Appellee took personal and financial responsibility for the appellant Fluhman during her 
pregnancy; he attempted to formally acknowledge his paternity by placing his name on 
the child's birth certificate, but was prevented from doing so by Fluhman; he voluntarily 
paid $165 to $175 per month in child support after the birth of the child; he purchased 
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various items for the child including clothing, books, changing table, diapers, toys, and 
other items on behalf of the child; he visited the child since her birth and did so twice a 
month on average, when allowed to do the same, even after the adoption had occurred 
until approximately August, 1998; he requested greater visitation but was not allowed 
more; he had at all times medical insurance available through his employment, and 
offered that insurance to the natural mother, who refused the insurance; he established a 
relationship with the minor child; he sought to parent the child; all of which facts 
establish that the Appellee had developed a substantial relationship with the child and 
taken a measure of responsibility to provide for the child, providing support to the natural 
mother during her pregnancy, and support thereafter and has demonstrated a full 
commitment to the child and was willing to do more and wished to do more, but was 
prohibited from doing the same by the Appellants. Because Appellee had established a 
substantial relationship, it was required on the part of the Appellants that they give him 
notice and/or obtain his consent before proceeding with the adoption proceedings. 
U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(a)(i)(A) or (B). Their failure to do the same, therefore, meant the 
adoption was not perfected as it related to the Appellee, and allowed him the right to 
proceed to file any and all actions necessary to establish his paternity and rights to 
Sidney. 
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Appellee had met his requirements and obligations as required pursuant to § 78-
30-4.14(2)(a)(i)(A) or (B). He had acquired the constitutional protection of an unmarried 
biological father pursuant to his timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth. U.C.A. § 78-30-
4.12(2)(e). 
Thus, even if this court determined that Sidney was less than six months old when 
she was placed with adoptive parents and the more stringent requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b) apply, the Appellee is nonetheless entitled to have 
the adoption decree set aside on state and federal constitutional grounds. The Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "no state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The same rights exist in the 
Utah Constitution Art I, Section 7. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
recognized that "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by coming 'forward to participate in the rearing of his 
child, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under 
the Due Process Clause." Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Caban v. 
Mohammed. 441 U.S. 380, 441 (1979)). The Appellee's relationship with Sidney is also 
-20-
protected under the Due Process Clause of both the United States and Utah's 
Constitutions. In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-30-4.13 through 78-30-4.15 are 
unconstitutional as applied in this case because they fail to adequately balance the rights 
and interests of all the parties affected. Furthermore, the procedures provided in the 
statutes do not adequately protect the liberty interest of the Appellee or the best interest 
of the child. The legislature has declared that the state has a compelling interest "in 
providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in 
preventing the disruption of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for 
the needs of children." U.C.A. § 78-30-4.12 (1953 as amended). However, the 
legislature has also mandated "that in every adoption the best interest of the child should 
govern and be of foremost concern in the court's interest." U.C.A. § 78-30-1.5 (1953 as 
amended) 
In this case, the state's interest is not nearly as compelling as it would be if the 
child were being placed with an agency or with new adoptive parents. Here, the child has 
been adopted by his grandmother and the birth mother has not relinquished custody of the 
child. 
-21-
Setting aside the adoption decree will not infringe on the Appellants interests 
because the adoption is a sham created to cut off Appellee's and Sidney's relationship. 
The Appellants have stated that their reason for having Parsons adopt the child was to 
provide the child with medical insurance coverage. However, the Appellee has medical 
insurance which covers Sidney and he informed Fluhman of this fact. The only reason 
that Appellants had Parsons adopt Sidney was to cut off the Appellee's parental rights. 
Sidney, the most important party involved here, is in no way benefitted from the 
feigned adoption by Parsons. Her birth mother is still the primary caretaker. Her 
grandmother has not changed her relationship with Sidney in any way. Indeed, Sidney is 
actually harmed by the adoption because she has lost her father and all of the things that 
only her natural father could provide. 
Sidney would benefit a great deal in having a father which would be in her best 
interests which best interest should count. U.C.A. § 78-30-1.5. Both Appellee and 
Sidney would be able to continue to develop their relationship and bond as parent and 
child. Sidney will benefit from future support, nurturing and guidance provided by her 
natural father. Sidney will benefit from the stability that her father will provide. 
Appellee has acted as a father to Sidney and has developed a substantial relationship with 
Sidney. He has never denied his paternity nor shirked his parental responsibilities. 
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Appellee has regularly visited with Sidney and has voluntarily provided child support for 
Sidney. The Appellee would very much like to continue to develop his relationship with 
Sidney. It would be a gross miscamage of justice and due process to arbitrarily sever the 
substantial relationship that has already been initiated by Appellee merely because the 
Appellee did not formally acknowledge his paternity by the time the adoption had been 
filed and/or entered. 
In a similar case In re K.B.E. & T.M.E., supra, an unmarried biological father 
contested the adoption of his child to the natural mother and her grandfather pursuant to 
an older version of the statutes at issue here. In the name of due process and fundamental 
fairness, the Utah Court of Appeals validated the father's acknowledgment of paternity 
although he had not met the statutory requirements. Id. After weighing the competing 
interests of the parties involved, the court determined that the child would be benefitted, 
nor harmed, from the opportunity to develop a relationship with the natural father. Id. 
The court stated: "respondent will provide financial support for T.M.E. and that 
respondent will be able to develop a parental relationship with T.M.E." Id. The court 
concluded that it would contravene fundamental fairness "to deprive both respondent and 
T.M.E. of the possible benefits of their relationship." Id. Likewise, fundamental 
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fairness, due process and the best interest of the child require that Appellee be allowed to 
develop and maintain his relationship with Sidney. 
Based on the trial court's findings and conclusions, it was not necessary for the 
trial court to determine fraud nor the constitutionality of the adoption statutes. If this 
court concludes that the more restrictive requirement contained in U.C.A. § 78-30-
4.14(2)(b) applies, then this court should find that the statutory law as it would apply to 
the appellee is unconstitutional based on the facts and circumstances as exist in this case. 
The Appellants have addressed in their brief an issue complaining that they were 
not "on notice" of the Appellee's position pursuant to his complaint and the proceedings 
occurring herein. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Appellee made a motion 
for summary judgment or the issues of placement and the adoption statute was addressed 
pursuant to that motion and the response as made therein. (R. 20-21, 36-65, 66-68) These 
issues were made and identified both in writing at the time of the hearing on the Motion 
to Dismiss on February 2, 1999. (R. p. 75-76) The court even referenced the same at 
trial on April 27, 1999 (Tr. p. 4) Further, the trial court, at trial, allowed all testimony 
dealing with the facts at issue in the case, and at the conclusion of the trial, had requested 
of Appellee the relief he so sought, which relief was to have the adoption set aside and 
allow the Appellee to continue his relationship with the child and act as the father for the 
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child to establish his paternity to the child. (Tr. p. 223) Pursuant to Rule 54(c)(1) and 
(15)(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint could be amended at trial. 
The court can and did make findings based on the evidence. The trial court has that 
discretion. See Westlev v. Farmer's Ins Exch.. 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). Morris v. 
Russell 120 Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451 (Utah 1951); Draper v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc.. 
121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d 360 (Utah 1952); England v. Horbach. 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1997). The prayer for relief as always requested pursuant to the Appellee's complaint 
was to "set aside the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman and to have plaintiff declared to 
be the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman, with him awarded all rights, titles, and 
obligations as would be appropriate for a natural father, including the requirements of 
paying support, visitation, and the like . . . ." (R. at p7) 
The trial court had asked, as to the theory of the Appellee's case, and it had been 
informed that it hinges on whether the child was six months old when it was "placed" for 
adoption and if that was the case, that it would be determined pursuant to the adoption 
statute under either 2(a) or 2(b). (Tr. at p. 4.) There was no coaching from the court, as 
supposedly claimed by Appellants. The lack of notice claim is without a basis and 
improperly made to this court. 
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The Appellants further claim that pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-30-4.16(3), that the 
decree is final and thus may not be contested by the Appellee. This is incorrect and not 
in conformity with § 78-30-4.16(1) which provides " . . . if a party who was entitled to 
notice and consent under the provisions of this chapter, was denied that right, and did not 
otherwise waive or forfeit that right under the terms of this chapter, the court may: 
(a) enjoin the adoption or dismiss the adoption petition, and 
proceed in accordance with subsection (2) or; 
(b) determined whether proper grounds for termination of the 
parent's rights exist and, if so, order that the parent's rights be terminated in 
accordance with provisions of this chapter . . . ." 
Because the trial court determined that the Appellee is entitled to notice, the 
adoption decree is not final within the meaning and term of the statute. It can only be 
final after an adjudication of his rights and duties and/or after receiving his consent, none 
of which has been accomplished or done. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.16(3) therefore is not 
applicable to this case. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The ruling by the trial court was based upon the statutes and the facts as existed, 
and as they continue to exist. The Appellee had met his obligation as required pursuant 
to statute to require that he be given notice of any adoption proceedings involving the 
child based upon his relationship to the child. No such notice was ever given by 
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Appellants. The sham adoption by Parsons was the vehicle that has been attempted to be 
used to cut off Appellee's rights to his child. The trial court determined that notice 
needed to be given before the adoption proceedings could be completed as against the 
rights of Appellee to the child. This gave each party its rights to either proceed with a 
paternity action by the Appellee or proceed, after the giving of notice, with the adoption 
by the Appellants. This court should sustain the findings, conclusions, and order, and 
award to the Appellee his costs and any additional relief which the court deems 
appropriate. . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) ° day of December, 2000. 
RANDY S. LUDLOW 
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APPENDIX 
78-30-1 JUDICIAL CODE 624 
of this chapter by releasing or making public that confidential 
information, or by otherwise breaching the confidentiality 
requirements of this chapter, is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor, unless the information is otherwise released or pro-
vided pursuant to the provisions of Title 26, Chapter 6a. 1999 
PART IV 
PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 30 
ADOPTION 
Section 
78-30-1. Who may adopt — Adoption of minor — Adop-
tion of adult. 
78-30-1.1. Licensed child placing agency — Defined. 
78-30-1.5. Legislative intent — Best interest of child. 
78-30-1.6. Children in the custody of the Division of Child 
and Family Services — Consideration of 
child's relationship with foster parents who 
petition for adoption. 
78-30-2. Relative ages. 
78-30-3. Adoption by married persons. 
78-30-3.5. Preplacement and postplacement adoptive 
evaluations — Exceptions. 
78-30-4, 78-30-4.1. Repealed. 
78-30-4.2 to 78-30-4.5. Renumbered as §§ 78-30-4.18 to 78-30-
4.21. 
78-30-4.6 to 78-30-4.8. Repealed. 
78-30-4.9. Renumbered. 
78-30-4.10. Repealed. 
78-30-4.11. Definition. 
78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in adop-
tion proceedings. 
78-30-4.13. Notice of adoption proceedings. 
78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquish-
ment for adoption. 
78-30-4.15. Responsibility of each party for their own ac-
tions — Fraud or misrepresentation — 
Statutory compliance. 
78-30-4.16. Contested adoptions — Rights of parties — 
Determination of custody. 
78-30-4.17. Parents whose rights have been terminated. 
78-30-4.18. Persons who may take consents and relin-
quishments. 
78-30-4.19. Time period prior to birth mother's consent. 
78-30-4.20. When consent or relinquishment effective. 
78-30-4.21. Power of a minor to consent or relinquish. 
78-30-4.22. Custody pending final decree. 
78-30-4.23. Criminal sexual offenses. 
78-30-4.24. Determination of rights prior to adoption peti-
tion. 
78-30-5. Repealed. 
78-30-6. Consent of child — When necessary. 
78-30-7. Jurisdiction of district and juvenile court — 
Time for filing. 
78-30-8. Agreement by adoptive parent or parents. 
78-30-8.5. Alien child — Evidence of lawful admission to 
United States required. 
78-30-9. Decree of adoption — Best interest of child — 
Legislative findings. 
78-30-10. Name and status of adopted child. 
78-30-11. Birth parents' rights and duties dissolved. 
78-30-12, 78-30-13. Repealed. 
78-30-14. Division of Child and Family Services — Du-
ties — Report — Fee. 
78-30-14.5. Fees. 
Section 
78-30-15. Petition, report, and documents to be sealed — 
Exceptions. 
78-30-15.1. Compliance with the Interstate Compact on 
Placement of Children. 
78-30-15.5. Itemization of fees and expenses. 
78-30-16. Definitions —Applications. 
78-30-17. Nonidentifying health history of adoptee filed 
with bureau — Limited availability. 
78-30-18. Mutual-consent, voluntary adoption registry 
— Procedures — Fees. 
78-30-19. Restrictions on disclosure of information — 
Violations — Penalty. 
78-30-1. Who may adopt — Adoption of minor — Adop-
tion of adult. 
(1) Any minor child may be adopted by an adult person, in 
accordance with the provisions and requirements of this 
section and this chapter. 
(2) Any adult may be adopted by another adult. However, 
all provisions of this chapter apply to the adoption of an adult 
just as though the person being adopted were a minor, except 
that consent of the parents of an adult person being adopted is 
not required. 
(3) (a) A child may be adopted by: 
(i) adults who are legally married to each other in 
accordance with the laws of this state, including 
adoption by a stepparent; or 
(ii) any single adult, except as provided in Subsec-
tion (3)(b). 
(b) A child may not be adopted by a person who is 
cohabiting in a relationship tha t is not a legally valid and 
binding marriage under the laws of this star, ~ » pur-
poses of this Subsection (3)(b), "cohabiting" mear. , a i d -
ing with another person and being involved in a sexual 
relationship with tha t person. 2000 
78-30-1.1. Licensed child placing agency — Defined. 
As used in this chapter the term "licensed child placing 
agency" means an agency licensed to place children for adop-
tion under Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Par t 6. 1995 
78-30-1.5. Legislative intent — Best interest of child. 
(1) It is the intent and desire of the Legislature that in 
every adoption the best interest of the child should govern and 
be of foremost concern in the court's determination. 
(2) The court shall make a specific finding regarding the 
best interest of the child, in accordance with Section 78-30-9 
and the provisions of this chapter. 2000 
78-30-1.6. Children in the custody of the Division of 
Child and Family Services — Consideration 
of child's relationship with foster parents 
who petition for adoption. 
In assessing the best interest of a child in the custody of the 
Division of Child and Family Services whose foster parents 
have petitioned for adoption, the court shall give special 
consideration to the relationship of the child with his foster 
parents , if the child has been in tha t home for a period of six 
months or longer. 1997 
78-30-2. Relative ages. 
A person adopting a child must be at least ten years older 
than the child adopted, unless the petitioners for adoption are 
a married couple, one of which is at least ten years older than 
the child. 1985 
78-30-3. Adoption by married persons. 
A married man who is not lawfully separated from his wife 
may not adopt a child without the consent of his wife, neither 
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may a married woman who is not separated from her husband 
adopt a child without his consent, if the spouse not consenting 
is capable of giving tha t consent. 1990 
78-30-3.5. Prep lacement and pos tp lacement adopt ive 
eva luat ions — Except ions . 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a child 
may not be placed in an adoptive home until a 
preplacement adoptive evaluation, assessing the prospec-
tive adoptive parent and the prospective adoptive home, 
has been conducted in accordance with the requirements 
of this section. 
(b) The court may, at any time, authorize temporary 
placement of a child in a potential adoptive home pending 
completion of a preplacement adoptive evaluation de-
scribed in this section. 
(c) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply if a birth parent has 
legal custody of the child to be adopted and the prospec-
tive adoptive parent is related to that child as a step-
parent, sibling by half or whole blood or by adoption, 
grandparent, aunt, uncle, or first cousin, unless the evalu-
ation is otherwise requested by the court. The prospective 
adoptive parent described in this Subsection (c) shall, 
however, obtain the information described in Subsections 
(2)(a) and (b), and file that documentation with the court 
prior to finalization of the adoption. 
(d) The requirements of Subsection (l)(a) are satisfied 
by a previous preplacement adoptive evaluation con-
ducted within three years prior to placement of the child, 
or an annual updated adoptive evaluation conducted after 
that three-year period or within one year after finaliza-
tion of a previous adoption. 
(2) The preplacement adoptive evaluation shall include: 
(a) criminal history record information regarding each 
prospective adoptive parent and any other adult living in 
the prospective home, received from the Criminal Inves-
tigations and Technical Services Division of the Depart-
ment of Public Safety, in accordance with Section 53-10-
108, no earlier than 18 months immediately preceding 
placement of the child; 
(b) a report from the Department of Human Services 
containing all information regarding reports and investi-
gation of child abuse, neglect, and dependency, with 
respect to each prospective adoptive parent and any other 
adult living in the prospective home, obtained no earlier 
than 18 months immediately preceding placement of the 
child, pursuant to waivers executed by those parties; and 
(c) an evaluation conducted by an expert in family 
relations approved by the court or a certified social 
worker, clinical social worker, marriage and family thera-
pist, psychologist, professional counselor, or other court-
determined expert in family relations, who is licensed to 
practice under the laws of this state. The evaluation shall 
be in a form approved by the Department of Human 
Services. Neither the Department of Human Services nor 
any of its divisions may proscribe who qualifies as an 
expert in family relations or who may conduct evaluations 
pursuant to this Subsection (2). 
(3) A copy of the preplacement adoptive evaluation shall be 
filed with the court. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (b) and (c), a 
postplacement evaluation shall be conducted and submit-
ted to the court prior to the final hearing in an adoption 
proceeding. The postplacement evaluation shall include: 
(i) verification of the allegations of fact contained 
in the petition for adoption; 
(ii) an evaluation of the progress of the child's 
placement in the adoptive home; and 
(iii) a recommendation regarding whether the 
adoption is in the best interest of the child. 
(b) The exemptions from and requirements for evalua-
tions, described in Subsections (l)(c), (2)(c), and (3), also 
apply to postplacement adoptive evaluations. 
(c) Upon the request of the petitioner, the court may 
waive the postplacement adoptive evaluation, unless it 
determines that it is in the best interest of the child to 
require the postplacement evaluation. 
(5) If the person or agency conducting the evaluation dis-
approves the adoptive placement, either in the preplacement 
or postplacement adoptive evaluation, the court may dismiss 
the petition. However, upon request of a prospective adoptive 
parent, the court shall order that an additional preplacement 
or postplacement adoptive evaluation be conducted, and hold 
a hearing on the suitability of the adoption, including testi-
mony of interested parties. 
(6) Prior to finalization of a petition for adoption the court 
shall review and consider the information and recommenda-
tions contained in the preplacement and postplacement adop-
tive studies required by this section. 1999 
78-30-4, 78-30-4.1. Repealed. 1990,1995 
78-30-4.2 to 78-30-4.5. Renumbered as §§ 78-30-4.18 to 
78-30-4.21. 1995 
78-30-4.6 to 78-30-4.8. Repealed. 1995 
78-30-4.9. Renumbered as § 78-30-4.22. 1995 
78-30-4.10. Repealed. 1995 
78-30-4.11. Definition. 
For purposes of this chapter, "unmarried biological father" 
means a child's biological father who is not married to the 
child's mother at the time of the conception or birth of that 
child. 1995 
78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in 
adoption proceedings. 
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of ail 
parties affected by an adoption proceeding must be considered 
and balanced in determining what constitutional protections 
and processes are necessary and appropriate. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing 
stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a 
prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive 
placements, and in holding parents accountable for meet-
ing the needs of children; 
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility 
of making crucial decisions about the future of a newborn 
child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make 
timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future 
and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance 
regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement; 
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and 
stability in adoptive placements; 
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected 
liberty and privacy interest in retaining custody of an 
adopted child; and 
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate 
interest that acquires constitutional protection only when 
he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and 
upon the child's birth. The state has a compelling interest 
in requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate 
that commitment by providing appropriate medical care 
and financial support and by establishing legal paternity, 
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(3) (a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21, 
the Legislature prescribes the conditions for determining 
whether an unmarried biological father's action is suffi-
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ciently prompt and substantial to require constitutional 
protection 
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the 
opportunities to establish a relationship with his child 
that are available to him, his biological parental interest 
may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitu-
tional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by 
his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps 
to substantiate it 
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary m order to 
facilitate the state's compelling interest The Legislature 
finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the child, 
and the adoptive parents described in this section out-
weigh the interest of an unmarried biological father who 
does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and 
demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance 
with the requirements of this chapter 
(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary 
responsibility to protect his rights 
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to t now 
tha t the child may be adopted without his consent unless 
he strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter, 
manifests a prompt and full commitment to his parental 
responsibilities, and establishes paternity 
(4) The Legislature finds tha t an unmarried mother has a 
right of privacy with regard to her pregnancy and adoption 
plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the 
identity of an unmarried biological father prior to or during an 
adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to volunteer infor-
mation to the court with respect to the father 1995 
78-30-4.13. Notice of adoption proceedings. 
(1) An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that 
he has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is 
deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption 
proceeding regarding that child may occur, and has a duty to 
protect his own rights and interests He is therefore entitled to 
actual notice of a birth or an adoption proceeding with regard 
to that child only as provided in this section 
(2) Notice of an adoption proceeding shall be served on each 
of the following persons 
(a) any person or agency whose consent or relinquish-
ment is required under Section 78 30-4 14 unless that 
right has been terminated by waiver, relinquishment, 
consent, or judicial action, 
(b) any person who has initiated a paternity proceeding 
and filed notice of that action with the state registrar of 
vital statistics within the Department of Health, in accor-
dance with Subsection (3), 
(c) any legally appointed custodian or guardian oi the 
adoptee, 
(d) the petitioner's spouse, if any, only if he has not 
joined in the petition, 
(e) the adoptee's spouse, if any, 
(f) any person who is recorded on the birth certificate 
as the child's father, with the knowledge and consent of 
the mother, 
(g) any person who is openly living in the same house-
hold with the child at the time the consent is executed or 
relinquishment made, and who is holding himself out to 
be the child's father, and 
(h) any person who is married to the child's mother at 
the time she executes her consent to the adoption or 
relinquishes the child for adoption 
(3) (a) In order to preserve any right to notice and consent, 
an unmarried biological father may initiate proceedings 
to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uni-
form Act on Paternity, and file a notice of the initiation of 
those proceedings with the state registrar of vital statis-
tics within the Department of Health prior to the mother's 
execution of consent or her relinquishment to an agency 
That action and notice may also be filed prior to the child's 
birth 
(b) If the unmarried biological father does not know the 
county in which the birth mother resides, he may initiate 
his action in any county, subject to a change in trial 
pursuant to Section 78-13-7 
(c) The Department of Health shall provide forms for 
the purpose of filing the notice described in Subsection 
(3)(a), and make those forms available in the office of the 
county health department m each county 
(4) Notice provided in accordance with this section need not 
disclose the name of the mother of the child who is the subject 
of an adoption proceeding 
(5) The notice required by this section may be served 
immediately after relinquishment or execution of consent, but 
shall be served at least 30 days prior to the final dispositional 
hearing The notice shall specifically state that the person 
served must respond to the petition within 30 days of service 
if he intends to intervene in or contest the adoption 
(6) (a) Any person who has been served with notice of an 
adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the adop-
tion shall file a motion in the adoption proceeding within 
30 days after service The motion shall set forth specific 
relief sought and be accompanied by a memorandum 
specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the 
motion is based 
(b) Any person who fails to file a motion for relief 
withm 30 days after service of notice waives any right to 
further notice in connection with the adoption, forfeits all 
rights in relation to the adoptee, and is barred from 
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert 
any interest m the adoptee 
(7) Service of notice under this section shall be made as 
follows 
(a) With regard to a person whose consent is neces-* iry 
under Section 78-30-4 14, service shall be m accordance 
with the provisions of the Utah Eules of Civil Procedure 
If service is by publication, the court shall designate the 
content of the notice regarding the identity of the parties 
The notice may not include the name of the person or 
persons seeking to adopt the adoptee 
(b) As to any other person for whom notice is required 
under this section, service by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, is sufficient If that service cannot be com-
pleted after two attempts, the court may issue an order 
providing for service by publication, posting, or by any 
other manner of service 
(c) Notice to a person who has initiated a paternity 
proceeding and filed notice of that action with the state 
registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health in 
accordance with the requirements of Subsection (3), shall 
be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, at 
the last address filed with the registrar 
(8) The notice required by this section may be waived in 
writing by the person entitled to receive notice 
(9) Proof of service of notice on all persons for whom notice 
is required by this section shall be filed with the court before 
the final dispositional hearing on the adoption 
(10) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither 
the notice of an adoption proceeding nor any process in that 
proceeding is required to contain the name of the person or 
persons seeking to adopt the adoptee 
(11) Except as to those persons whose consent to an adop-
tion is required under Section 78-30-4 14, the sole purpose of 
notice under this section is to enable the person served to 
intervene in the adoption and present evidence to the court 
relevant to the best interest of the child 2000 
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78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relin-
quishment for adoption. 
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child-
placing agency or consent to adoption is required from: 
(a) the adoptee, if he is more than 12 years of age, 
unless he does not have the mental capacity to consent; 
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee 
who was conceived or born within a marriage, unless the 
adoptee is 18 years of age or older; 
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage; 
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to 
be the child's biological father by a court of competent 
jurisdiction prior to the mother's execution of consent or 
her relinquishment to an agency for adoption; 
(e) any biological parent who has executed a voluntary 
declaration of paternity in accordance with Title 78, 
Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's execution of consent or 
her relinquishment to an agency for adoption; 
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, as 
defined in Section 78-30-4.11, only if the requirements 
and conditions of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been 
proven; and 
(g) the licensed child-placing agency to whom an 
adoptee has been relinquished and that is placing the 
child for adoption. 
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an 
unmarried biological father is necessary only if the father has 
strictly complied with the requirements of this section. 
(a) (i) With regard to a child who is placed with adop-
tive parents more than six months after birth, an 
unmarried biological father shall have developed a 
substantial relationship with the child, taken some 
measure of responsibility for the child and the child's 
future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by financial support of 
the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in accor-
dance with the father's ability, when not prevented 
from doing so by the person or authorized agency 
having lawful custody of the child, and either: 
(A) visiting the child at least monthly when 
physically and financially able to do so, and when 
not prevented from doing so by the person or 
authorized agency having lawful custody of the 
child; or 
(B) regular communication with the child or 
with the person or agency having the care or 
custody of the child, when physically and finan-
cially unable to visit the child, and when not 
prevented from doing so by the person or autho-
rized agency having lawful custody of the child. 
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biologi-
cal father, whether expressed or otherwise, unsup-
ported by evidence of acts specified in this subsection 
shall not preclude a determination that the father 
failed to meet the requirements of this subsection. 
(iii) An unmarried biological father who openly 
lived with the child for a period of six months within 
the one-year period after the birth of the child and 
immediately preceding placement of the child with 
adoptive parents, and openly held himself out to be 
the father of the child during that period, shall be 
deemed to have developed a substantial relationship 
with the child and to have otherwise met the require-
ments of this subsection. 
(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of 
age at the time he is placed with adoptive parents, an 
unmarried biological father shall have manifested a full 
commitment to his parental responsibilities by perform-
ing all of the acts described in this subsection prior to the 
time the mother executes her consent for adoption or 
relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency. 
The father shall: 
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity un-
der Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, 
and file with that court a sworn affidavit stating that 
he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the 
child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, and 
agreeing to a court order of child support and the 
payment of expenses incurred in connection with the 
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth; 
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity 
proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics 
within the Department of Health, in a confidential 
registry established by the department for that pur-
pose; and 
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, 
paid a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses 
incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy 
and the child's birth, in accordance with his means, 
and when not prevented from doing so by the person 
or authorized agency having lawful custody of the 
child. 
(3) An unmarried biological father whose consent is re-
quired under Subsection (1) or (2) may nevertheless lose his 
right to consent if the court determines, in accordance with the 
requirements and procedures of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4, 
Termination of Parental Rights Act, that his rights should be • 
terminated, based on the petition of any interested party. 
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological 
father has consented to or waived his rights regarding a 
proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file with the court a 
certificate from the state registrar of vital statistics within the 
Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has been 
made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological 
fathers described in Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has 
been found pertaining to the father of the child in question, or 
if a filing is found, stating the name of the putative father and 
the time and date of filing. That certificate shall be filed with 
the court prior to entrance of a final decree of adoption. 
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and 
strictly comply with each of the conditions provided in this 
section, is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right 
in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any 
judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the 
child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not 
required. 1995 
78-30-4.15. Responsibi l i ty of each party for their o w n 
act ions — Fraud or misrepresentat ion — 
Statutory compl iance . 
(1) Each parent of a child conceived or born outside of 
marriage is responsible for his or her own actions and is not 
excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this 
chapter based upon any action, statement, or omission of the 
other parent or third parties. 
(2) Any person injured by fraudulent representations or 
actions in connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue 
civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law. A 
fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance 
with the requirements of this chapter, and is not a basis for 
dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption 
decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party. 
Custody determinations shall be based on the best interest of 
the child, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-30-
4.16. 
(3) The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk 
of fraud or misrepresentation in adoption proceedings, and 
has provided a method for absolute protection of an unmarried 
biological father's rights by compliance with the provisions of 
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this chapter. In balancing the rights and interests of the state, 
and of all parties affected by fraud, specifically the child, the 
adoptive parents, and the unmarried biological father, the 
Legislature has determined that the unmarried biological 
father is in the best position to prevent or ameliorate the 
effects of fraud and that, therefore, the burden of fraud shall 
be borne by him. 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological 
father who resides in another state may not, in every circum-
stance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly 
comply with, the requirements of this chapter. Therefore when 
all of the following requirements have been met, that unmar-
ried biological father may contest an adoption, prior to final-
ization of the decree of adoption, and assert his interest in the 
child; the court may then, in its discretion, proceed with an 
evidentiary hearing under Subsection 78-30-4.16(2): 
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has 
resided in another state where the unmarried mother was 
also located or resided; 
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or 
informing the unmarried biological father that she could 
be located in the state of Utah; 
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every 
reasonable means, attempted to locate the mother but 
does not know or have reason to know that the mother is 
residing in the state of Utah; and 
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with 
the most stringent and complete requirements of the state 
where the mother previously resided or was located, in 
order to protect and preserve his parental interest and 
right in the child in cases of adoption. 1998 
78-30-4.16. Contested adoptions — Rights of parties — 
Determination of custody. 
(1) Whenever any party contests an adoption, the court 
shall first determine whether the provisions of this chapter 
have been complied with. If a party who was entitled to notice 
and consent under the provisions of this chapter, was denied 
that right, and did not otherwise waive or forfeit that right 
under the terms of this chapter, the court may: 
(a) enjoin the adoption, or dismiss the adoption peti-
tion, and proceed in accordance with Subsection (2); or 
(b) determine whether proper grounds for termination 
of that parent's rights exist and, if so, order that the 
parent's rights be terminated in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4, 
Termination of Parental Rights Act. 
(2) (a) In any case, and under any circumstance, if a court 
determines that a petition for adoption may not be 
granted, the court may not automatically grant custody of 
a child to a challenging biological parent, but shall con-
duct an evidentiary hearing in each case, in order to 
determine who should have custody of the child, in 
accordance with the child's best interest. 
(b) Evidence considered at that hearing may include, 
but is not limited to, evidence of psychological or emo-
tional bonds that the child had formed with third parties 
and any detriment that a change in custody may cause to 
the child. The fact that a person relinquished a child to a 
licensed child placing agency or executed a consent for 
adoption may not be considered by the court as evidence of 
neglect or abandonment. 
(c) Any custody order entered pursuant to this section 
may also include provisions for visitation by a biological 
parent or interested third party, and provide for the 
financial support of the child. 
(3) An adoption may not be contested after the final decree 
of adoption is entered. 1995 
78-30-4.17. Parents whose rights have been termi-
nated. 
Neither notice nor consent to adoption or relinquishment for 
adoption is required from a parent whose rights with regard to 
an adoptee have been terminated by a court. 1995 
78-30-4.18. Persons w h o may take consents and relin-
quishments. 
(1) A consent or relinquishment by a birth mother or an 
adoptee shall be signed before: 
(a) a judge of any court that has jurisdiction over 
adoption proceedings, or a public officer appointed by that 
judge for the purpose of taking consents or relinquish-
ments; or 
(b) a person who is authorized by a licensed child-
placing agency to take consents or relinquishments so 
long as the signature is notarized or witnessed by two 
individuals who are not members of the birth mother's 
immediate family. 
(2) If the consent or relinquishment of a birth mother or 
adoptee is taken out of state it shall be signed before: 
(a) a person who is authorized by a child-placing 
agency licensed by that state to take consents or relin-
quishments; or 
(b) a person authorized or appointed to take consents 
or relinquishments by a court of this state that has 
jurisdiction over adoption proceedings, or a court of that 
state that has jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. 
(3) The consent or relinquishment of any other person or 
agency as required by Section 78-30-4.14 may be signed before 
a Notary Public or any person authorized to take a consent or 
relinquishment under Subsection (1) or (2). 
(4) A person, authorized by Subsection (1) or (2) to take 
consents or relinquishments, shall certify to the best of his 
information and belief that the person executing the consent 
or relinquishment has read and understands the consent or 
relinquishment and has signed it freely and voluntarily. 
(5) A person executing a consent or relinquishment is 
entitled to a copy of the consent or relinquishment. 2000 
78-30-4.19. Time period prior to birth mother's con-
sent. 
A birth mother may not consent to the adoption of her child 
or relinquish control or custody of her child until at least 24 
hours after the birth of her child. 1995 
78-30-4.20. When consent or re l inquishment effective. 
A consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed 
and may not be revoked. 1995 
78-30-4.21. P o w e r of a minor to consent or re l inquish. 
A minor parent has the power to consent to the adoption of 
his or her child and has the power to relinquish his or her 
control or custody of the child to a licensed child-placing 
agency. That consent or relinquishment is valid and has the 
same force and effect as a consent or relinquishment executed 
by an adult parent. A minor parent, having executed a consent 
or relinquishment, cannot revoke that consent upon reaching 
the age of majority or otherwise becoming emancipated. 1995 
78-30-4.22. Custody pending final decree. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by the court, once a 
petitioner has received the adoptee into his home and a 
petition for adoption has been filed, the petitioner is entitled to 
the custody and control of the adoptee and is responsible for 
the care, maintenance, and support of the adoptee, including 
any necessary medical or surgical treatment, pending further 
order of the court. 
(2) Once a child has been placed with, relinquished to, or 
ordered into the custody of a licensed child-placing agency for 
purposes of adoption, the agency shall have custody and 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY SANCHEZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LAURA FLUHMAN, PAIGE PARSONS, 
and SIDNEY LAKEN FLUHMAN, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 984701550CS 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on the 27th day of April, 1999. The 
petitioner was present and represented by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondents, 
Laura Fluhman and Patricia Paige Parsons were present and represented by their attorney of record, 
Keith E. Eddington. The court having taken testimony together with receiving exhibits from the 
parties, the court having previously had filed memorandums and based upon such and for good cause 
appearing herein the court makes these its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. All parties in this matter are and were at all times residents of Davis County. 
2. The petitioner and Laura Fluhman had a sexual relationship. 
3. As a result of the sexual relationship between petitioner and Laura Fluhman the parties had 
born to them a child, to wit: Sidney Laken Fluhman who was born on March 26, 1997. 
4. The petitioner went to the hospital where the child was born in order to see the child and 
to determine what was necessary in order to have him deemed as the father of the child. 
5. Upon going to the hospital the petitioner was informed that the child was not there by the 
hospital staff based on information given to the staff by Laura Fluhman. 
6. The petitioner thereafter was able to see the child at the hospital. 
7. After the child was born the petitioner began to visit with the child and he commenced 
making child support payments. 
8. Prior to the birth of the child the petitioner had given some monies to the respondent, 
Laura Fluhman. 
9. The petitioner continued to give to Laura Fluhman child support in the amount of 
approximately $165.00 per month commencing April 1997 which he increased to $175.00 in 
December 1997 and continued thereafter in until he went to make the February 1998 payment which 
was thereafter refused to be accepted by the respondent, Laura Fluhman. It was at this time that she 
informed the petitioner of the adoption of her child by Paige Parsons (aka Patricia Paige Parsons). 
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10. Paige Parsons is the mother of Laura Fluhman and is the grandi notl ler of Sidi i&] I ak .en 
Fluhman. 
11 lietnii I'mi'iftiiiiin nil.; IlK' * liilil MJ|»| UH I pasnuMil, llir pclili. .iei had deposited monies into 
the A merica First Credit Union account of Laura Fluhman prior to the child's birth. He also 
purchased various items for the baby including clothing, book, changing table, diapers, toys and other 
items : • ' 
1..' I he petitioner had continually visited with the child since its birth and did so twice a 
month on average and was thereafter allowed to do the same after the adoption had occurred until 
approximated Aiyust 1998. 
1? On Api ^ 1 ? I I °97 the respondent, Paige Parsons, filed a petition for adoption seeking 
County,, in case no. 9729001 lHxv~>. 
1 1 Patricia Paige Parsons, respondent herein, was a resident of Davis County as was the 
child at the time i: nr i ^^ - ^ 
15. No a</:;-."':':S ueu* taken by Patricia Paiue Parsons \o complete the adoption or to do a/113 r 
January 12, 1998 which would have been approximately ten (10) months aftei the bii tl 11 : i Sidi ie> 
Laken Fluhman. 
"i If is T - '" Jl sp i tc i 1 ' ' L i t ' h r pctifi -mi is in Idv t Ilii ii,il i 1! Ltlii i i ul SUIIICN L i L 11 ( l u h i n a n 
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17. No notice was sent to the petitioner or any contact made by either Laura Fluhman or 
Paige Parsons informing him of Paige Persons' intent to adopt Sidney Laken Fluhman. 
18. In February 1998, the petition seeking the adoption by Patricia Paige Parsons of Sidney 
Laken Fluhman was granted by the Second District Court, Davis County, state of Utah and a Decree 
of Adoption was entered in case no. 982700016. Sidney Laken Fluhman was approximately eleven 
(11) months old at the time this Decree had been entered. 
19. After the adoption had occurred the petitioner was informed by the respondents that the 
basis for the adoption was to allow Sidney Laken Fluhman to be placed on the insurance of Patricia 
Paige Parsons. 
20. The petitioner at all times has had medical insurance available through his employment 
and offered that insurance to Laura Fluhman and she refused it. 
21. The petitioner did not file an acknowledgment of paternity in this matter. 
22. The petitioner had in fact developed and established a relationship with the minor child 
prior to being prohibited from continuing with that relationship by the respondents. 
23. The respondent, Laura Fluhman, has health problems and it was her intent and desire that 
should something happen to her as a result of her health problems that the child not be raised by the 
petitioner but only be allowed to be raised by her mother Patricia Paige Parsons. 
24. Since the birth of the child the child has continuously lived with the respondent Laura 
Fluhman. Laura Fluhman takes care of the child each day including the preparation of the child's 
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meals. clothir.*. * . • '.- v; *~ ! The child resides with her in her room. There has 
been no time period since its buM. w\wu use child has changed its living conditions or status. Prior 
e 
conditions for the child and respondents even now. 
25. The respondent, Paige Parsons, does financially assist I .aura Fluhman and Sidney 
I liilnium Mitiiliiily ii'i, .n tj-iiiinlpaiiiiiil • . 
From the foregoing Findings of Fac: i]w , \ \ n ! makes these its 
1. rheinuia J • i - : • PatneiaPaig' Pa*. :: i -\ ioption of the cl lild was filed 
in the Third District Court, Salt I ,ake County in, civil no. 972900190AI > was improper and the court 
1:1 lei 3in \\ as v\ itl 101 it ji in: isdictioi I to act. • . • 
2. The only court w hich w ould hav e had jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the petition 
would have been the Second District Court, Davis County, state of I Jtah 
3 Pi n si in Li .1 t I Jtall! i, Cc : 1< \ t i i § 78 30 7 i 
in the district where the person adopting resides vwncl* m r us particular case would \\w K.vr. n 
.. *n this action the child was "placed for adoption ' when the child was at least six (6) 
months old with the time being on approximately January/12,1998 when the adoption was transferred 
1 : till: „ : • Second Di 1 i i : 1 , .< : w m I: i„i i c; i si : i n lit i i l >< n 982 700016. 
00006013.99 5 
5. The petitioner had developed a substantial relationship with the child in view of the child's 
age. The petitioner had visited with the child at least monthly. The petitioner had taken a measure 
of responsibility to provide for the child including obtaining gifts, providing money to the natural 
mother, support payments and monies given during the natural mother's pregnancy. The petitioner 
had demonstrated a full commitment to the child and was willing to do even more than he had 
previously given to the child. He spent time with the child under the restrictions and prohibitions as 
put upon him by the respondents. 
6. Because the respondent, Laura Fluhman, has continually lived with her mother, the child's 
placement has never been such as to put the petitioner on notice as is contemplated pursuant to the 
statute. "Placement" means having the person on notice that something has occurred. In this action 
nothing has occurred that could be seen or deemed as placing the petitioner on notice that the child 
was "placed for adoption". 
7. The adoption in probate number 982700016AD on February 9, 1998 is not perfected as 
to the petitioner. 
DATED this ^-tvV day of $^-1999 
BY THE COURT: 
THOMAS L. KA 
District Court Judge 
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